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Recently in the psychological field, attitudes are being recognized as existing on
the explicit and implicit level (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Aversive racists
have been defined as people low in explicit prejudice but high in implicit prejudice (Son
Hing, Li, & Zanna, 2002). The purpose of this study was to determine what distinguishes
those who are low in prejudice from aversive racists. Participants were compared on eight
different constructs: authenticity, moral judgment development, moral identity,
nonprejudice, social dominance, authoritarianism, empathy, and social desirability. No
differences were found between low prejudice people and aversive racists. People high in
explicit prejudice were found to differ from people low in explicit prejudice on
authenticity, moral judgment development, moral identity, nonprejudice, social
dominance, and authoritarianism.
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Introduction
Recently, the psychological field has experienced a shift in paradigms as attitudes
have begun to be examined in not only a conscious manner but in an unconscious manner
as well (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Attitudes are being recognized as
existing on two levels: explicit and implicit. Explicit attitudes are attitudes that a person
publicly and consciously endorses, while implicit attitudes present themselves as actions
and judgments that are automatically activated without the person's awareness
(Greenwald et al.). In many cases, the attitudes expressed on an explicit level and on an
implicit level agree. For instance, in the case of insects, both implicit and explicit
attitudes concur as people generally report a negative explicit view of insects and also
display an implicit bias against insects (Greenwald et al.). Agreement between implicit
and explicit attitudes is not always the case, though.
For example, in topics where there is a societal norm to respond in a certain
manner, explicit and implicit attitudes can differ. For instance, Greenwald et al. (1998)
demonstrated that a disagreement appeared between implicit and explicit attitudes on
attitudes regarding racial or ethnic groups. On explicit measures, people tended to
respond in an egalitarian fashion (i.e., no prejudice), while on implicit measures, those
same people tended to respond in a manner favoring their in-group (Greenwald et al.). In
this experiment, there was one exception (out of 26) to this finding; one participant had a
positive implicit score and a positive explicit score (Greenwald et al.).
A natural conclusion one might come to regarding the dichotomy that is
sometimes found between implicit and explicit attitudes is that they are not measuring the
same construct. However, the findings of Asendorpf, Banse, and Mucke (2002) and
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Dambrun and Guimond (2004) suggest otherwise. Asendorpf et al. demonstrated a
double dissociation (i.e., two similar but different behaviors are controlled by two
different entities) in their study suggesting the two kinds of attitudes do in fact tap into
the same construct. Participants completed an explicit self-rating measure of shyness and
an Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998) version modified to deal with
shyness (Asendorpf et al.). The IAT is a well-known and widely used measure designed
to illustrate a person’s implicit attitudes or associations of various constructs (i.e., gender,
race, self-constructs, etc.). The IAT requires a person to categorize two objects along
with positive and negative attributes. If a person responds quickly when an object is
paired with positive (or negative) attributes, then it can be inferred that those two
constructs (i.e., the object and the positive or negative attributes) are associated very
closely together. If an object is closely associated with a negative attribute then it can
further be inferred that the person holds a generally negative view of the object.
Asendorpf et al. found that the explicit measure predicted a person’s controlled shy
behavior, while the IAT predicted a person’s spontaneous shy behavior. This suggests
that implicit and explicit measures are measuring the same construct because they predict
the same behavior under different circumstances. Dambrun and Guimond (2004)
manipulated relative gratification (i.e., people led to believe they are privileged, or in a
gratified position), which is a process that increases explicit prejudicial attitudes, and
found that implicit prejudicial attitudes also increased. Together, these findings indicate
that implicit attitudes and explicit attitudes are part of the same constructs.
According to Asendorpf et al. (2002), findings like these support the Motivation
and Opportunity as Determinants (MODE) model of attitude-behavior relations (Fazio,
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1990). MODE suggests that measures of implicit attitudes predict spontaneous or
automatic behavior better than controlled behavior, while measures of explicit attitudes
predict controlled behavior better than spontaneous or automatic behavior (Fazio &
Towles-Schwenn, 1999). Related to and supportive of MODE is the behavior
manifestation that can be witnessed in the aversive racism literature. Aversive racists are
defined by Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) as people who consciously advocate egalitarian
attitudes but subconsciously have negative feelings toward out-groups, particularly
African-Americans. Aversive racists have also been categorized as people low in explicit
prejudice (i.e., negative evaluations of out-groups that are consciously endorsed) but high
in implicit prejudice (i.e., negative associations of out-groups that are unconscious; Son
Hing, Li, & Zanna, 2002). Aversive racists often perform behavior that is egalitarian
when the situation is unambiguous, but when the situation is ambiguous, aversive racists
often display biases (Gaertner & Dovidio).
An example will clarify this matter. Hodson, Dovidio, and Gaertner (2002) had
European-American participants, who were divided into high and low prejudice scoring
groups by responses on an explicit measure of prejudice, evaluate applications for
admission to a university. When the situation was unambiguous (i.e., the applicant had
either high aptitude and achievement scores or low aptitude and achievement scores)
African-American and European-American applicants were accepted at the same rate by
both high and low prejudiced groups. However, when the situation was ambiguous (i.e.,
the applicant had a high aptitude score and a low achievement score, or vice versa) bias
was observed as European-Americans were accepted to the university at higher rates than
African-Americans by the high prejudiced group.
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In a similar fashion, Dovidio and Gaertner (2000) demonstrated that while selfreported prejudice has diminished in recent history, the level of bias in selection decisions
has not decreased. Dovidio and Gaertner had participants complete a self-report measure
of prejudice and make hiring decisions based on qualifications of job applicants. Two
different groups of participants completed this study; one group participated in 1989,
while the other group participated in 1999. The authors found that self-reported prejudice
decreased across the 10 year span, but bias in hiring decisions in an ambiguous situation
remained at a constant (Dovidio & Gaertner). This decrease in explicit prejudice, but
consistency in implicit prejudice, may suggest that people are becoming more conscious
of negative attitudes and what society advocates as correct. This trend of explicit
prejudice decreasing with implicit prejudice remaining constant has been shown in other
ways as well.
For example, Baron and Banaji (2006) sought to understand the development of
implicit prejudice. They gave six-year-olds, ten-year-olds, and adults, an explicit measure
of prejudice and an implicit measure of prejudice. Baron and Banaji found that explicit
prejudice was rather strong with the six-year-olds and steadily declined with the adults
until the attitudes were seen as egalitarian. Implicit prejudice, on the other hand, was
steady and did not change across the age groups (Baron & Banaji). With implicit attitudes
being established at such an early age, one ponders if they are hard wired into the brain
and are more of an internal structure rather than an external presence that can be changed
like a habit.
Purpose of the Current Study
So far, the discussion has focused on differences between implicit and explicit
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attitudes, and on aversive racism as a way to address the differences that can exist
between these attitudes. While some findings (e.g., Baron & Banaji, 2006; Dovidio &
Gaertner, 2000; Greenwald et al., 1998) may suggest that all people are implicitly
prejudiced, the aversive racism literature has shown this is not the case. The question of
interest where the current study is concerned is what aspects of an individual lead that
person to be someone who is low prejudiced or is an aversive racist. There is limited
research on this topic, and because of the behavioral implications of aversive racism (e.g.,
job selection) more research is needed. Before discussing the limited research, the various
manners of operationally defining aversive racism should be highlighted.
To date, aversive racism has been measured in a number of ways. Gaertner and
Dovidio (1986) used a behavioral task that involved participants making a selection
decision to determine aversive racism. Van Heil and Mervielde (2005) used a self-report
scale to identify aversive racists. Son Hing, Li, and Zanna (2002) used an explicit and an
implicit measure of prejudice to define aversive racism. The current study operationally
defines an aversive racist as a person low in explicit prejudice but high in implicit
prejudice (i.e., in the manner of Son Hing, et al.). Now the literature will be discussed.
A literature search only produced two studies on the topic of characteristics of
aversive racism. Silvestri and Richardson (2001) examined the relationship between the
Big Five personality constructs and aversive racism, finding that the constructs of
agreeableness, extraversion, and openness were negatively correlated with aversive
racism. This suggests that aversive racists are more prone to skepticism and critical
evaluation of others, and they are socially reserved and conventional (Silvestri &
Richardson). Van Heil and Mervielde (2005) examined the connection of social
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dominance orientation and authoritarianism to aversive racism. Social dominance and
authoritarianism were found to differentiate between egalitarianism and aversive racism,
indicating that aversive racists prefer inequality among social groups, submit to
authorities, possess a general aggressiveness, and adhere to social conventions (Van Heil
& Mervielde).
While Silvestri and Richardson (2001) and Van Heil and Mervielde (2005) have
noted some important relationships with aversive racism, there is still much ground left to
uncover. This study will move away from examining the Big Five Personality factors in
conjunction with aversive racism for a few reasons. The Big Five Personality factors are
so broad and general that some aspect of the factors can be found to correlate with most
other constructs. Also, given that these factors have been examined and a relationship has
been established, the urgency to establish a connection no longer exists. There is a need
to explore further the contributions of social dominance and authoritarianism in the
tradition of Van Heil and Mervielde, however. This is because Van Heil and Mervielde
used a different definition for aversive racism (i.e., as a reluctance to interact with
members of an out-group) than what is used in the proposed study. Also, these two
constructs are theoretically relevant to aversive racism.
In examining contributions to aversive racism versus those to truly low prejudice,
I propose that specific relationships will be seen on dimensions of authenticity, moral
judgment development, moral identity, nonprejudice, social dominance, authoritarianism,
empathy, and social desirability. Each of these constructs is reviewed below. With the
exception of social dominance and authoritarianism, most of these constructs have not
been examined in connection with aversive racism or with implicit attitudes. Thus, the
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support given for each construct's relationship with aversive racism is largely inferential.
Nonetheless, the theoretical nature of these constructs along with some of these
constructs’ noted relationships with explicit prejudice suggest that they may pertain to the
likelihood of aversive racism.
Authenticity
Authenticity is defined as the unhindered operation of a person's true self in daily
activities (Goldman & Kernis, 2002). Kernis and Goldman (2005) conceptualize
authenticity as being comprised of four components: awareness, unbiased processing,
behavior, and relational orientation. The awareness component deals with awareness of
and trust in one's feelings and desires. Unbiased processing of information involves not
denying or modifying private knowledge, internal experiences, or externally based
evaluative information. The behavior component of authenticity involves people acting in
agreement with their true selves. The relational orientation component deals with the
amount to which a person values and achieves openness and truthfulness in the person’s
close relationships.
If a person explicitly reports low prejudice and also scores high on an authenticity
scale, then it would make logical sense that the person would further score low on an
implicit measure of prejudice. An authentic person operates from his or her true self in an
unobstructed manner (Kernis & Goldman, 2005). The highly authentic person’s implicit
attitude should match his or her explicit attitude because the person authentically presents
the person’s true self/feelings to the outside world. This does not mean that high
authenticity scores would necessarily decrease the likelihood of aversive racism, though.
For example, for a person with a truly authentic understanding of self, scores on an
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explicit measure of prejudice should correspond with how he or she scores on the implicit
measure whether the explicit measure of prejudice is positive or negative. If a person is
low in authenticity, this person would present a false representation of him/herself to the
world. This could translate into a person being labeled as an aversive racist, because the
person has negative implicit attitudes, but does not willingly express these feelings and
thus reports positive explicit attitudes.
Moral Judgment Development
The neo-Kohlbergian approach to moral judgment development emphasizes
cognition, personal construction of epistemological categories, and change over time in
terms of development with a shift during young adulthood from conventional to
postconventional moral thinking (Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, & Bebeau, 2000). The neoKohlbergian approach defines moral judgment development as occurring in schemas
rather than in hard stages. Schemas are general knowledge structures that exist in longterm memory and facilitate information-processing (Rest, Narvaez, Bebeau, & Thoma,
1999). The neo-Kohlbergian approach devises three schema of moral judgment
development that a person progressively develops through, beginning at the lower levels
until reaching the highest level (although reaching the highest degree of schema
development does not occur in every instance; Rest, et al., 1999). The first is the personal
interest schema, followed by the maintaining norms schema, and finally the
postconventional schema.
A person operating from the personal interest schema justifies a decision
according to what is personally at stake for that person and what direct consequences
accompany the action (Rest, et al., 1999). A person operating from the maintaining norms
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schema justifies a decision according to the norms of society. A person operating from
this schema realizes that laws need to be established which the entire society follows. A
person operating from the postconventional schema realizes that moral obligations should
be based on shared ideals that are reciprocal and open to debate. The postconventional
thinker realizes that laws can be made in an arbitrary manner and do not necessarily mean
that a person must follow the laws. This person accepts that laws can be biased.
Moral schemas are seen as operating on an implicit and tacit level (Narvaez &
Bock, 2002). The Defining Issues Test (DIT; Rest et al., 1999) is said to measure moral
judgment development on a non-verbal and intuitive level (Narvaez & Bock). The DIT
accomplishes this by measuring recognition knowledge rather than explicit knowledge
(Rest et al., 1999). The manner in which the neo-Kohlbergians envision moral judgment
development is an implicit cognitive process rather than an explicit cognitive process.
When completing both the DIT and the IAT a person is required to recognize rather than
articulate responses. Because both measures are tapping into an implicit process, they
should reflect each other in certain ways.
People operating from the personal interest schema are more likely to be either
explicitly prejudiced or aversive racist because they are self-focused and would not be
implicitly or explicitly focused on treating others with justice and fairness. People
operating from the maintaining norms schema generally feel pressure to conform to
societal norms (Rest et al., 1999). Because they do conform, it is plausible that they
would be likely to explicitly report an attitude favoring nonprejudice (i.e., an attitude
approved by society) while having a different implicit attitude (i.e., like an aversive
racist). People operating from the postconventional schema tend to be outside of the
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pressure to conform to societal norms and are characterized by appealing to an ideal (Rest
et al.). Rest et al. state that these ideals can include things like mandating fair treatment,
actualizing personhood, and so forth. It seems plausible that people who make moral
decisions that are driven from the postconventional schema should report low explicit
prejudice as well as low implicit prejudice. It is possible that people operating at the
maintaining norms schema could be aversive racists if their implicit attitude differs from
their explicit attitude.
The relationship between moral reasoning and prejudice has been examined
minimally, however. It is logical to suggest that a person operating from an advanced
moral judgment developmental schema like the postconventional schema would be more
concerned with treating all people as equals (i.e., appeals to an ideal). McFarland (in
press) is the only study to be identified that has examined the relationship between moral
reasoning and prejudice. McFarland demonstrated that postconventional moral reasoning
was a negative predictor of generalized prejudice. McFarland’s finding deals with explicit
attitudes and moral reasoning but not with implicit attitudes. This current study hopes to
build upon McFarland's findings and supplement it by differentiating how moral
reasoning affects implicit and explicit attitudes.
Higher scores on the DIT have been linked to other constructs that should pertain
to prejudice, as well. For example, Rest et al. (1999) reported that higher scores have
been related to community involvement and civic responsibility. Derryberry and Thoma
(2005) demonstrated that moral judgment development predicted self-reported altruism
and attitudes regarding civil liberties. Given that higher moral judgment development
scores have been linked to prosocial behaviors like these, it seems plausible that
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developmentally more morally advanced people would also be concerned with treating
others as equals. So, people that are advanced in moral judgment development (i.e.,
consistently operating from the postconventional schema) should score low on explicit
and implicit measures of prejudice and therefore not be categorized as aversive racists.
Moral Identity
Hart, Atkins, and Ford (1998) defined moral identity as a commitment to one’s
understanding of self to behaviors that promote or protect the welfare of others. Blasi
(1984) suggests that moral identity is a mechanism that motivates moral action. Blasi
(1993) hypothesizes that moral understanding gives rise to moral action if one is deemed
personally responsible, moral responsibility is the outcome of integrating morality in
one’s identity, and moral identity drives one to make one’s actions consistent with one’s
ideals. In a similar vein, Rest proposes a Four Component model of moral functioning
(Narvaez & Rest, 1995). This model proposes that in order to produce moral behavior,
four processes must be present. The four components are moral sensitivity, moral
judgment, moral motivation, and implementation. Moral motivation suggests that a
person gives priority to the moral value above all other values and intends to fulfill it.
Both Rest and Blasi therefore agree that moral identity is important in performing moral
behavior.
Aquino and Reed (2002) examined the construct of moral identity as a connecting
piece between moral reasoning and moral behavior and created a measure to assess moral
identity. If a person is truly committed to being a moral person and engaging in moral
behaviors, then treating all humans with equality should be a priority to this person.
Aquino and Reed make the argument that moral identity is separate from moral reasoning
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because reasoning deals with the cognitive aspect of knowing right from wrong, while
identity deals with claiming moral traits as being essential to a person’s self-concept.
Aquino and Reed envision moral identity as being comprised of two components:
internalization and symbolization. Internalization deals with the self-importance of moral
characteristics, while symbolization refers to engaging in public actions that demonstrate
that a person values moral traits (i.e., volunteering at a homeless shelter). The
internalization component may reflect implicit processing. If some construct(s), in this
case moral traits, are internalized, then it would make sense that they would exist on an
implicit level. Aquino and Reed also correlated scores on the moral identity measure with
an IAT modified to deal with moral traits and the self. The IAT was correlated with the
internalization dimension but not the symbolization dimension (Aquino & Reed).
Aquino and Reed (2002) further demonstrated that a person who identifies highly
with moral traits also report greater amounts of volunteer behavior as opposed to
someone who does not identify with moral traits. This last finding has some problems as
both constructs, moral identity and volunteer behavior, were both determined by selfreports; it could be possible that people are savvy to what a researcher is looking for and
reporting in a like manner. To clear confusion, Aquino and Reed conducted a study
where they found that moral identity significantly predicted actual donation behavior.
The connection between moral identity and donation behavior is extremely
important. The experiment was set up in a way such that when the participants donated
there was no way for the researcher to know who did or did not donate (at least the
participants did not know of a way) (Aquino & Reed, 2002). This removes any social
desirability factor and suggests that people that consider morality a strong part of their
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self-concept will perform moral behavior when no reward is provided. This should play a
factor into why a person would be implicitly prejudiced and explicitly egalitarian as
opposed to both implicitly and explicitly egalitarian. If a person highly values and
identifies with moral traits, then it makes sense that the person should also value equality
and respect for various racial and ethnic groups on both implicit and explicit levels,
leading that person to be implicitly and explicitly low in prejudice. Reed and Aquino
(2003) examined this notion by demonstrating that a person who scored high on the
moral identity scale also viewed out-groups as the same as in-groups. People who
considered moral identity to be a very important self-relevant construct of theirs also had
more favorable attitudes toward relief efforts to aid out-groups (Reed & Aquino).
As noted previously, the argument that people high in moral identity are more
likely to be implicitly and explicitly egalitarian has been made. In the other direction,
people low in moral identity may be likely to be aversive racists because they are less
likely to have internalized moral traits, like treating others in an unbiased manner.
Because they have not internalized these traits, their explicit attitude is likely to differ
from their implicit attitude. Further, because we live in a society where unbiased behavior
is looked upon favorably, their explicit attitude will likely coincide with this, while their
implicit attitude may not.
Nonprejudice
A seemingly obvious construct that should predict if a person is truly low
prejudiced or is an aversive racist is nonprejudice. Phillips and Ziller (1997) have defined
nonprejudice as a universal orientation where similarities between the self and diverse
others are emphasized. Phillips and Ziller suggest that this perceived similarity is a
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fundamental link to a number of positive outcomes including helping, understanding, and
reduced prejudice. The authors further demonstrated that participants who scored high on
the Universal Orientation Scale (UOS; Phillips & Ziller), a measure of nonprejudice,
were as accepting of minority members as they were of nonminority members.
Participants scoring low on the UOS were also as accepting of minority members as high
scoring UOS participants, but high scoring UOS participants further rated the minority
members as equally attractive, similar, and desirable, while the low scoring UOS
participants did not (Phillips & Ziller). Given findings such as these, people who identify
themselves as having a universal orientation towards all racial and ethnic groups should
also be truly low prejudiced. People identifying themselves as not having a universal
orientation towards all racial and ethnic groups may be more likely to be aversive racists
because they do see differences in people. Seeing these differences could lead people to
show implicit bias against others while they still report explicit egalitarianism because
that is what is socially sanctioned.
Social Dominance Orientation
Social dominance theory states that societies reduce group conflict by creating a
consensus on ideologies that promote the superiority of one group over others (Pratto,
Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). Social dominance orientation (SDO) is the extent
to which people desire their in-group to be dominant and superior over out-groups (Pratto
et al.). People holding this belief will endorse laws and institutions that favor their ingroup and reduce equality.
Pratto et al. (1994) demonstrated that a measure of social dominance correlated
very strongly with measures of ethnic prejudice. Social dominance can be viewed as a
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generalized preference for group dominance that should influence a specific prejudice
against any given out-group. Pratto et al. particularly stress how correlated a person’s
social dominance is to anti-Black racism. Social dominance was correlated with antiBlack prejudice in every sample they ran from .42 to .65 (Pratto et al.).
Esses and Hodson (2006) corroborate Pratto et al.’s (1994) results by finding that
high social dominance-oriented individuals were likely to hold prejudicial attitudes
toward ethnic groups. Further, Esses and Hodson found that individuals high in social
dominance blame prejudice on societal factors (i.e., true group difference) instead of
personal factors (i.e., ignorance); people high in social dominance also do not support
social change. Henry, Sidanius, Levin, and Pratto (2005) found a positive relationship
between SDO and support for aggression against an out-group when a socially dominant
sample completed the measures, but a negative relationship was found between SDO and
support for aggression against an out-group when a subordinate group completed the
measures.
The link between SDO and explicit prejudice has been made, but the question of
SDO involvement in implicit prejudice has yet to be fully established. Van Heil and
Mervielde (2005), as stated before, found a relationship between SDO and aversive
racism, but they defined aversive racism as a reluctance to interact with members of an
out-group, which is inconsistent with previous definitions. Also, Van Heil and Mervielde
did not examine implicit attitudes. This study will examine SDO and aversive racism
according to already established definitions and means. It seems plausible to expect SDO
to affect implicit prejudice in a similar manner as it does explicit prejudice. People high
in implicit prejudice will likely score higher on a measure of SDO compared to people
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low in implicit prejudice. Further, aversive racists will be more likely to be high in SDO
because they are not likely to edit themselves when discussing social dominance because
it is a topic that is not as publicly disavowed as prejudice is.
Authoritarianism
Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) is defined as a high degree of submission to
authorities, a general aggressiveness toward various people that is approved by
authorities, and a high degree of conformity to social conventions (Altemeyer, 1988).
Altemeyer suggests RWA should be correlated with racial and ethnic prejudice. By
examining the definition of RWA this conclusion can be rationalized. In certain
sociocultural contexts in the United States, social convention is to shun minorities. In
such contexts, the authoritarian person would conform to this by carrying out the second
part of the definition by being aggressive toward these groups, believing he or she is
submitting to authorities. A person with an authoritarian personality would believe that
authorities approve of this type of prejudice (Altemeyer). This approval is not necessarily
an actual approval but is at least a perceived approval.
RWA Scale scores were found to correlate around .35 with attitude scales that
measured prejudiced opinions of ethnic and racial groups (Altemeyer). Altemeyer reports
that people high in authoritarian personality admit to more prejudice and meanspiritedness when answering anonymously compared to when there is a possibility to
identify them through a sign-up sheet. This finding presents a reason for any differences
found between an implicit measure and explicit measure of prejudice. In the case of an
explicit measure, the authoritarian person may adjust responses to maintain his or her
public image. In the case of implicit measures, this adjustment would be impossible
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because the person would be unable to control an unconscious cognition.
Henry et al. (2005) found a significant relationship between RWA and
intergroup aggression support for an out-group but not for an in-group. Esses and Hodson
(2006) demonstrated that individuals high in authoritarianism were likely to hold
prejudiced attitudes as measured on an explicit scale (i.e., Modern Racism Scale) that is
proposed to have low reactivity (i.e., the items on the scale are recognized to be
measuring racial prejudice; McConahay, 1986). Van Heil and Mervielde (2005) found a
connection between RWA and aversive racism, but implicit attitudes were not examined
in this study. Together, these findings suggest that aversive racists will score higher on a
RWA measure compared to people low in implicit prejudice. Both sets of people should
score similarly on explicit measures because of social norms.
Empathy
Empathy is the reaction of a person to the observed experiences of another (Davis,
1983). Two main components of empathy are perspective taking and concern for another.
Logically, these two components should lead to lower amounts of prejudice because an
empathic person is more likely to sympathize with the hardship of out-groups and
recognize these hardships. Batson et al. (1997) demonstrated that increasing empathy
toward an individual of a stigmatized group leads to improved attitudes toward the
overall group. Batson, Chang, Orr, and Rowland (2002) demonstrated that not only does
increasing empathy towards an individual of a stigmatized group improve attitudes
towards the overall group, but these improved attitudes also translate into behaviors
favoring the out-group. Johnson, Brems, and Alford-Keating (1997) found that greater
amounts of empathy predicted lower prejudice toward an out-group of people (i.e.,
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homosexuals). McFarland (in press) found that empathy correlated negatively with
generalized prejudice.
Given that variations of empathy have led to differences in explicit attitudes and
behaviors towards out-groups (e.g., Batson et al., 1997; Johnson, Brems, & AlfordKeating, 1997; Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland, 2002; McFarland, in press) a difference
between implicit attitudes is a logical proposition. Aversive racists will likely be low in
empathy because they are not in touch with their inner attitudes, so they would likely not
be in tune with others needs and desires. If they are not aware of others needs, desires,
etc. then they cannot be concerned about those things. Aversive racists may have
difficulty empathizing with others, which could lead them to not understanding the
difficulties of others and could further lead them to holding implicit prejudice while they
explicitly report a lack of prejudice possibly because of social sanctions.
Social Desirability
A common occurrence in survey research is the over reporting of socially
desirable attitudes and behaviors and the underreporting of attitudes and behaviors that
are socially undesirable (Krosnick, 1999). Most measures of explicit prejudice are
questionnaires and so they too would be affected by this phenomenon. Dunton and Fazio
(1997) found that European-American participants who were motivated to control their
prejudice reported less prejudiced responses on an explicit attitude measure while their
unobtrusive estimates indicated negativity in response to African-Americans. EuropeanAmerican participants who were not motivated to control their prejudice responded on an
explicit attitude measure consistent with their automatically activated attitudes (Dunton &
Fazio). Dambrun and Guimond (2004) also found that when there are strong norms
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against prejudice explicit and implicit measures are negatively correlated. This current
study will examine the degree that responding in a socially desirable manner contributes
to aversive racism. Whenever examining a discrepancy between implicit and explicit
attitudes, social desirability should be examined and possibly controlled for. Aversive
racists should respond in more socially desirable ways compared to low prejudice people.
Hypotheses
This study attempts to determine what constructs contribute to aversive racism.
The major hypothesis is that an aversive racist (i.e., a person high in implicit prejudice
and low in explicit prejudice) will differ from a low prejudice person (i.e., a person low
in implicit and explicit prejudice) on dimensions of authenticity, moral identity, moral
judgment development, social dominance orientation, authoritarianism, nonprejudice, and
social desirability. Specifically, an aversive racist will score higher on dimensions of
social dominance orientation, authoritarianism, and social desirability compared to a low
prejudice person. An aversive racist will further score lower on dimensions of
nonprejudice, moral judgment development, moral identity, and authenticity.

Method
Participants
Participants included 120 students from a large Southeastern university.
Participants were recruited via the Psychology’s study board subject pool. Participants
included 45 males and 75 females. For class year, 48 were freshmen, 18 were
sophomores, 22 were juniors, 20 were seniors, and 12 reported other for class year. Only
participants of European-American descent were used. Other ethnic/racial groups were
allowed to participate, but their data were not included (n=5). European-Americans were
specifically examined because the majority of students on Western Kentucky
University’s campus are European-Americans. More importantly, though, when aversive
racism was first conceptualized it was propositioned as a phenomenon that exists among
the majority racial class, particularly European-Americans (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986).
Measures
Demographic questionnaire. Participants were asked to record demographic
information, which includes age, gender, ethnicity, and college year in a demographics
questionnaire (Appendix A).
Authenticity. The Authenticity Inventory 3 (AI3; Kernis & Goldman, 2005;
Appendix B) measures participant's authenticity. The AI3 is composed of 45 five-point
Likert scale items, ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). The AI3
generates a composite score and four subcomponent scores: Awareness, Unbiased
Processing, Behavior, and Relational Orientation. Only the composite score was
referenced in the current study. Scores on the composite score can range from 45 to 225
where higher scores indicate greater authenticity. Higher scores indicate greater amounts
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of authenticity. Cronbach’s alpha measure of internal consistency is reported at α = .83
for the composite score (Kernis & Goldman). In the current study, Cronbach’s alpha
measure of internal consistency is reported at α = .88 for the composite score.
Moral judgment. The Defining Issues Test-2 (DIT-2; Rest, Narvaez, Thoma, &
Bebeau, 1999; Appendix C) is an objective measurement used to assess moral judgment.
A participant reads a series of five moral dilemmas and is asked to make an action choice
about what the protagonist in the dilemma should do. The participant can choose the
protagonist to either perform an action, not perform an action, or the participant indicates
that he or she cannot decide. After the action choice has been made, the participant is
presented with 12 issues that are rated on a scale of 1 to 5 in terms of overall importance
(1=great importance to 5=no importance) in facilitating the participant in making his or
her decision about what the protagonist should do. Finally, the participant ranks the four
most important items of the 12 that were useful in facilitating his or her action choice.
This process is performed for each dilemma. The issues that the participant rated and
ranked as important are used to determine what moral judgment schemas (i.e., personal
interest, maintaining norms, and postconventional) he or she considers important. This is
an indication of moral judgment development.
A variety of indices can be obtained from the DIT-2. This study references the
Personal Interest (PI), Maintaining Norms (MN), and Postconventional (P) scores. Each
of these scores ranges from 0-95, with greater scores indicating a greater preference of
reasoning from that moral judgment development schema. Cronbach’s alpha measure of
internal consistency is reported at α = .81 for postconventional items (Rest et al., 1999).
For the current study, Cronbach’s alpha measure of internal consistency is α = .73 for
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personal interest items, α = .71 for maintaining norms items, and α = .79 for
postconventional items.
Moral identity. The Moral Identity Scale is a measure developed by Aquino and
Reed (2002) to assess a person's self-identification of moral traits (Appendix D). The
measure is composed of nine moral traits (e.g., Generous, Helpful, etc.) and 10 items
assessing their self-importance that are rated on a five-point Likert scale, ranging from 1
(Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). The Moral Identity Scale measures two
constructs: Internalization and Symbolization. Internalization deals with the amount the
traits are central to the person's self-concept. Symbolization deals with the amount the
traits are reflected in the person's behavior. Each construct is composed of five items
apiece and scores on each range from 5 to 25, with higher scores indicating a greater
amount of the each respected factor. Cronbach’s alpha measure of internal consistency
for the Internalization and Symbolization were reported as α = .73 and α = .82,
respectively (Aquino & Reed). Cronbach’s alpha measure of internal consistency for
Internalization and Symbolization in the current study is α = .90 and α = .84, respectively.
Nonprejudice. The Universal Orientation Scale (UOS; Phillips & Ziller, 1997;
Appendix E) measures a participant's nonprejudice. The scale measures people's
identification to similarities they have with other people. The UOS is composed of 20
five-point Likert scale items, ranging from 1 (Does not describe me well) to 5 (Describes
me very well). Scores range from 20 to 100, where higher scores indicate nonprejudice.
Cronbach’s alpha measure of internal consistency is reported at α = .76 (Phillips &
Ziller). For the current study, Cronbach’s alpha measure of internal consistency is α =
.67.
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Social dominance orientation. The Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto et
al., 1994; Appendix F) scale measures a participant's desire for his/her in-group to be
dominant and superior to other out-groups. The SDO scale is composed of 16 seven-point
Likert scale items, ranging from 1 (Very negative) to 7 (Very positive). Scores range from
16 to 112 with low scores indicating endorsement of equality among groups and high
scores indicating endorsement of domination of certain groups over other groups.
Cronbach’s alpha measure of internal consistency is reported at α = .90 (Pratto et al.). For
the current study, Cronbach’s alpha measure of internal consistency is α = .93.
Authoritarianism. The Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (RWA; Altemeyer,
2006; Appendix G) measures a participant’s endorsement of authoritarian ideals. The
RWA scale is composed of 22 items nine-point Likert scale items, ranging from -4 (Very
strongly disagree) to 4 (Very strongly agree). Scores can range from 30 to 270 (-4 is
scored as 1, -3 is scored as 2, … 4 is scored as 9), higher scores indicate a participant’s
endorsement of authoritarian ideals. Test-retest reliability has been reported to range from
r=.85 to r=.95 (Altemeyer, 2006). Cronbach’s alpha measure of internal consistency is
reported to range from α = .85 to α = .89 (Altemeyer, 2006). For the current study,
Cronbach’s alpha measure of internal consistency is α = .94.
Dispositional empathy. The Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980;
Appendix H) measures four different aspects of empathy: fantasy, perspective taking,
empathic concern, and personal distress. Each subscale is composed of seven items,
yielding a 28 item measurement overall. Items are responded to on a five-point Likert
scale, ranging from 0 (Does not describe me very well) to 4 (Describes me very well).
Scores can range from 0 to 112 with high scores indicating greater amounts of empathy.

24
On all subscales, higher scores indicate greater amounts of empathy in regard to the
respected scale. Test-retest reliability has been reported to range from r=.61 to r=.81
(Davis, 1980). Only the composite score is used in the current study. For the current
study, Cronbach’s alpha measure of internal consistency is α = .82.
Social desirability. The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding version 6
(BIDR-6; Paulhus, 1991; Appendix I) measures participants’ manner to respond in
socially desirable ways. The questionnaire is composed of 40 seven-point Likert items,
ranging from 1 (Not true) to 7 (Very true). Scores can range from 40 to 280. Higher
scores imply socially desirable responses. For the current study, Cronbach’s alpha
measure of internal consistency is α = .76.
Explicit prejudice. The Attitude Toward Blacks (ATB; Brigham, 1993; Appendix
J) is composed of 20 items that measure participant attitudes toward African-Americans.
Items are ranked on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 7
(Strongly agree). Scores on the ATB range from 20 to 140, with lower scores indicating
negative attitudes toward African-Americans and higher scores indicate positive attitudes
toward African-Americans. Cronbach’s alpha measure of internal consistency is reported
at α = .88 (Brigham). Cronbach’s alpha measure of internal consistency for the ATB in
the current study is α = .86.
Implicit prejudice. The Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, &
Schwartz, 1998) measures participant's associations of two target concepts with an
attribute. The IAT is composed of five sequences that are presented via the software
package Inquisit. In the first sequence, the participant categorizes pictures of faces as
being either African-American or European-American by selecting a different key on the
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computer for each category. In the second sequence, the participant categorizes adjectives
as either pleasant or unpleasant. In the third sequence, the two previous tasks are
combined and the participant must categorize European-American faces and pleasant
adjectives with one key and African-American faces and unpleasant adjectives with
another key. In the fourth sequence, the keys for identifying European-American and
African-American faces are reversed and the participant categorizes them again. In the
final sequence, the participant categorizes the European-American faces and unpleasant
adjectives with one key and the African-American faces and pleasant words with another
key. If any of the concepts are associated (e.g., African-American faces and pleasant
adjectives) then the participant should find one of the combination sequences (Sequence
Three or Five) to be much easier than the other. Ease of identification is noted by
recording response times. The difference between these two sequences provides the
measure of implicit attitudinal difference between target concepts.
Procedure
Participants signed up for the study and selected a timeslot via the WKU study
board. The study was split between two sessions. The study was split into two sessions
because participants may have become fatigued completing all measures in a single
session. One session took place online before the participant came into the laboratory. At
the first session, the participants completed the Moral Identity Scale, BIDR-6, RWA
scale, SDO scale, UOS, IRI, ATB scale, and the AI3. The second session took place in
the laboratory. Upon a participant's entry into the lab, the researcher greeted the
participant and briefly explained the purpose of the study. The participant was then seated
at a computer. Using the computer, the participant took the IAT and the DIT-2. The IAT
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was selected to be completed in the lab because it must be run on specific software. The
DIT-2 was selected to be completed in the lab because the directions for it are long and
participants often have questions. All of the various measures from the first session were
counterbalanced and the measures from the second session were counterbalanced. After
completion of the measures, the participant was thanked for his or her participation and
allowed to leave.

Results
Descriptive information for participants’ responses to the various questionnaires
can be found in Table 1.
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
Index

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

AI3

161.21

18.01

120

PI

28.79

11.63

120

MN

28.02

12.34

120

P

36.70

16.67

120

MI-I

22.41

4.02

120

MI-S

16.89

4.07

120

UOS

70.65

8.01

120

SDO

39.96

17.70

120

RWA

89.05

32.66

120

IRI

95.92

13.08

120

BI-6

156.25

25.46

120

ATB

107.68

16.74

120

IAT

-.52

.42

120

Note: AI3 = Authenticity Inventory 3 Composite Score, PI = DIT-2 Personal Interest Score, MN = DIT-2
Maintaining Norms Score, P = DIT-2 Postconventional Score, MI-I = Moral Identity Internalization Score,
MI-S = Moral Identity Score, UOS = Universal Orientation Scale Score, SDO = Social Dominance
Orientation Scale Score, RWA = Right Wing Authoritarian Score, IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index
Score, BI-6 = Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding version 6 Score, ATB = Attitude Toward
Blacks Score, IAT = Implicit Association Test of Race Score.

The sample as a whole reports to be fairly authentic and empathetic, is modal at
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the postconventional schema of moral judgment development, possesses moderate (i.e.,
symbolization) to high (i.e., internalization) moral identity, tends to see more similarities
in others than differences, is low in social dominance and authoritarianism, and is neither
low nor high in responding in a socially desirable manner. Participant responses indicate
that the group on average is low in explicit prejudice but is slightly high in implicit
prejudice.
Correlations among the different measures are noted in Table 2. As marked,
significant correlations exist among many of the various indices. The strongest
relationships are seen among the indices that measure similar constructs (e.g., SDO and
RWA).
Participants were categorized as being either low or high in explicit prejudice by
their scores on the ATB. Participants scoring 100 or higher (N=87) were considered to be
low in explicit prejudice, while those scoring lower than 100 (N=33) were considered to
be high in explicit prejudice. The score of 100 was determined to be the dividing line
because if a person responds that he or she slightly agrees (i.e., selects “5,”which
indicates a lack of prejudice) with the 20 items that person would receive a score of 100.
Any score below 100 would indicate the person has at least a slight prejudice toward
African Americans. Because the population of interest were aversive racists (i.e., people
low in explicit prejudice but high in implicit prejudice), the low explicit prejudice
participants were further divided into low, mild, and high implicitly prejudiced groups.
This was accomplished by splitting the low explicit participants into thirds according to
scores on the IAT. Generally, when dividing participants into high and low scoring, data
are dichotomized and a standard deviation of the data is removed from around the mean
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Table 2
Correlation Matrix
AI3

PI

MN

P

MI-I

MI-S

UOS

SDO

RWA

IRI

BI-6

ATB

AI3

1

PI

-0.047

1

MN

-0.013

-.317**

1

P

0.018

-.475**

-.618**

1

MI-I

.197*

-0.042

0.016

0.04

1

MI-S

.241**

-0.011

0.095

-0.053

.453**

1

UOS

.316**

-0.044

-0.081

0.092

.283**

.248**

1

SDO

-.316**

0.055

0.065

-0.085

-.196*

-0.125

-.348**

1

RWA

-0.038

0.039

.356**

-.304**

-0.05

0.111

-.203*

.399**

1

IRI

0.16

-0.099

-0.122

0.176

0.149

.319**

.346**

-.309**

-0.102

1

BI-6

-.394**

0.101

-.179*

0.055

-0.134

-.243**

-0.132

0.078

-0.199

-0.103

1

ATB

-.344**

0.147

.188*

-.331**

-.291**

-0.125

-.405**

.597**

.369**

-.332**

-0.104

1

IAT

0.013

0.032

0.065

-0.047

0.114

0.091

0.102

-0.057

0.08

0.017

-0.132

-0.114

IAT

1

Note: ** p<.01, * p<.05; AI3 = Authenticity Inventory 3 Composite Score, PI = DIT-2 Personal Interest Score, MN = DIT-2 Maintaining Norms Score, P = DIT-2
Postconventional Score, MI-I = Moral Identity Internalization Score, MI-S = Moral Identity Score, UOS = Universal Orientation Scale Score, SDO = Social
Dominance Orientation Scale Score, RWA = Right Wing Authoritarian Score, IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index Score, BI-6 = Balanced Inventory of
Desirable Responding version 6 Score, ATB = Attitude Toward Blacks Score, IAT = Implicit Association Test of Race Score.
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(to assure that the low and high groups really are different from each other). By dividing
the data into thirds, the middle standard deviation was allowed to become another group
for analysis rather than completely disregarding the data. Four groups were ultimately
created for analysis. Group 1 (n = 29) consisted of participants low in explicit prejudice
and high in implicit prejudice (i.e., aversive racists). Group 2 (n = 29) consisted of
participants low in explicit prejudice and medium in implicit prejudice (i.e., medium
implicitly prejudiced). Group 3 (n = 29) consisted of participants low in both explicit and
implicit prejudice (i.e., truly low prejudiced). Group 4 (n = 33) consisted of participants
high in explicit prejudice (i.e., explicitly prejudiced). Each group’s mean and standard
deviation for each dependent variable is noted in Table 3.
A series of Multivariate Analyses of Variances (MANOVAs) and Analyses of
Variances (ANOVAs) were conducted to examine any differences among groups. Moral
identity subscales (i.e., Internalization and Symbolization), authenticity, and universal
orientation were examined together in one MANOVA. This group was selected because
they are theoretically similar in that they deal with aspects of the self, and all four
constructs were highly correlated. Social dominance orientation and authoritarianism
were grouped together in one MANOVA. These two variables were examined in
conjunction because they tend to center around similar ideologies in terms of dominance
and submission, and are also significantly correlated. Moral judgment developmental
schemas (i.e., Personal interest, Maintaining norms, and Postconventional) were grouped
together in one MANOVA. The moral judgment developmental indexes were examined
together because viewing each index together gives a more complete picture of moral
judgment development, and are significantly correlated. Social desirability and empathy
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were examined separately in two ANOVAs. These two constructs were examined alone
because they did not consistently correlate to a specific group of indices.
Table 3
Group Scores on Dependent Variables
Group 1

Group 2

Group 3

Group 4

DV

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

AI3

166.07

19.71

163.86

17.27

165.62

17.11

150.73

13.78

PI

29.42

11.03

22.60

10.57

29.94

11.39

32.65

11.55

MN

24.57

10.08

25.06

11.78

30.21

13.24

31.72

12.86

P

40.30

13.79

46.09

16.48

34.13

17.32

27.52

13.49

MI-I

22.31

4.60

23.52

1.62

24.03

1.24

20.09

5.38

MI-S

16.59

4.92

16.69

3.64

18.48

3.42

15.94

3.90

UOS

71.00

8.18

72.62

9.21

73.03

7.16

66.52

5.87

SDO

34.38

13.25

34.10

16.98

34.93

16.86

54.42

14.58

RWA

76.90

29.10

78.93

34.46

92.48

32.73

105.61

27.00

IRI

100.14

15.32

96.52

11.93

95.28

12.31

92.24

11.95

BI-6

162.48

20.33

157.52

22.75

155.03

37.73

150.73

16.74

Note: Group 1 = Aversive Racist (Low Explicit Prejudice, High Implicit Prejudice), Group 2 = Mild
Implicit Prejudice Group (Low Explicit Prejudice, Mild Implicit Prejudice), Group 3 = Low Prejudice
Group (Low in Explicit and Implicit Prejudice), Group 4 = High Explicit Prejudice Group (High in Explicit
Prejudice). AI3 = Authenticity Inventory 3 Composite Score, PI = DIT-2 Personal Interest Score, MN =
DIT-2 Maintaining Norms Score, P = DIT-2 Postconventional Score, MI-I = Moral Identity Internalization
Score, MI-S = Moral Identity Score, UOS = Universal Orientation Scale Score, SDO = Social Dominance
Orientation Scale Score, RWA = Right Wing Authoritarian Score, IRI = Interpersonal Reactivity Index
Score, BI-6 = Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding version 6 Score.

The first series of analyses only examined the three implicit groups because the
original research question involved the differences between aversive racists (i.e., Group
1) and truly low prejudiced people (i.e., Group 3). Multivariate tests examining
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authenticity, moral identity subscales, and universal orientation revealed no significant
differences among the groups. Univariate tests examining these constructs also revealed
no significant differences.
Multivariate tests examining SDO and RWA revealed no significant differences
among the groups. Univariate tests further revealed no significant differences.
Multivariate tests examining moral judgment development constructs revealed a
significant difference among groups (F [6, 166] = 2.765, p < .05, η2 = .091). Univariate
tests revealed a significant difference among groups for postconventional reasoning (F [2,
84] = 4.086, p < .05, η2 = .089). Bonferonni post hoc tests revealed that the medium
implicitly prejudiced group operated at a higher level of postconventional reasoning than
the truly low prejudiced group (p < .05). Univariate tests also reported significant
differences in personal interest scores (F [2, 84] = 4.017, p < .05, η2 = .087). Bonferonni
post hoc tests revealed that the truly low prejudiced group operated at a higher level of
personal interest reasoning than the medium implicitly prejudiced group (p < .05).
Univariate tests examining social desirability and empathy were performed.
Neither of these tests revealed significant differences.
Additional analyses were also performed, in order to include the explicitly
prejudiced group. MANOVAs and ANOVAS were performed to assess any differences
between the explicitly prejudiced group and the three low explicit groups. The same tests
performed for the low explicit groups were carried out again, with the inclusion of the
explicitly prejudiced group (i.e., Group 4). Again, moral identity subscales (i.e.,
Internalization and Symbolization), authenticity, and universal orientation were examined
together in one MANOVA. Social dominance orientation and authoritarianism were
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grouped together in one MANOVA. Moral judgment development schemas (i.e.,
Personal interest, Maintaining norms, and Postconventional) were grouped together in
one MANOVA. Social desirability and empathy were examined separately in two
ANOVAs.
Multivariate tests examining authenticity, moral identity subscales, and universal
orientation revealed a significant difference (F [12, 345] = 3.215, p < .01, η2 = .101).
Univariate tests revealed a significant difference among groups on moral identity
internalization (F [3, 116] = 6.863, p < .01, η2 = .151). Bonferonni post hoc tests revealed
that the explicitly prejudiced group was lower in internalization than the medium
implicitly prejudiced group (p < .05) and lower than the truly low prejudiced group (p <
.05). Univariate tests further revealed a significant difference among groups on
authenticity (F [3, 116] = 5.861, p < .01, η2 = .132). Bonferonni post hoc tests revealed
that the explicitly prejudiced group was lower in authenticity than the aversive racist
group (p < .05), than the medium explicitly prejudiced group (p < .05), and lower than
the truly low prejudiced group (p < .05). Univariate tests further revealed a significant
difference among groups on universal orientation (F [3, 116] = 4.819, p < .01, η2 = .111).
Bonferonni post hoc tests revealed that the explicitly prejudiced group was lower in
universal orientation than the medium implicitly prejudiced group (p < .05) and lower
than the truly low prejudiced group (p < .05).
Multivariate tests examining RWA and SDO revealed a significant difference (F
[6,232] = 7.015, p < .01, η2 = .154). Univariate tests revealed a significant difference
among groups in RWA (F [3, 116] = 5.834, p < .01, η2 = .131). Bonferonni post hoc tests
revealed that the explicitly prejudiced group was higher in RWA than the aversive racist
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group (p < .05) and higher than the medium implicitly prejudiced group (p < .05).
Univariate tests revealed a significant difference among groups in SDO (F [3, 116] =
13.290, p < .001, η2 = .256). Bonferonni post hoc tests revealed that the explicitly
prejudiced group was higher in SDO than the aversive racist group (p < .05), higher than
the medium implicitly prejudiced group (p < .05), and higher than the truly low
prejudiced group (p < .05).
Multivariate tests examining moral judgment development constructs revealed a
significant difference among groups (F [9, 348] = 3.500, p < .001, η2 = .083). Univariate
tests revealed a significant difference among groups for postconventional reasoning (F [3,
116] = 8.415, p < .001, η2 = .179). Bonferonni post hoc tests revealed that the explicitly
prejudiced group was lower in postconventional reasoning than both the aversive racist
group (p < .05) and the medium implicitly prejudiced group (p < .05). Bonferonni post
hoc test also showed that the medium implicitly prejudiced group was higher than the low
implicit/low explicit group (p < .05). Univariate tests revealed a significant difference
among groups for maintaining norms reasoning (F [3, 116] = 2.720, p < .05, η2 = .066).
Bonferonni post hoc tests did not reveal any significant differences among the groups,
though the explicitly prejudiced and truly low prejudiced groups were higher than the
aversive racist and medium implicitly prejudiced groups. Univariate tests revealed a
significant difference among groups for personal interest reasoning (F [3, 116] = 4.421, p
< .05, η2 = .103). Bonferonni post hoc test showed that the explicitly prejudiced group
was higher in personal interest reasoning than the medium implicitly prejudiced group (p
< .05).
Univariate tests examining social desirability and empathy were performed.
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Neither of these tests revealed significant differences.
In summary, no significant differences were found between aversive racist and
truly low prejudiced people. The medium implicitly prejudiced group was found to
reference postconventional reasoning more often than the truly low prejudiced group. The
truly low prejudiced group was also found to emphasize personal interest reasoning more
often than the medium implicitly prejudiced group. The explicitly prejudiced group
differed from the other three groups (i.e., aversive racist, medium implicitly prejudiced,
and truly low prejudiced groups) on every construct with the exception of social
desirability and empathy.

Discussion
The purpose of this study was to determine what distinguishes those who are truly
low prejudiced from aversive racists. Eight different constructs were considered. These
constructs were authenticity, moral judgment development, moral identity, nonprejudice,
social dominance, authoritarianism, empathy, and social desirability. Specifically, it was
proposed that aversive racists would score higher on dimensions of social dominance,
authoritarianism, and social desirability compared to truly low prejudiced people.
Further, it was hypothesized that aversive racists would score lower on dimensions of
nonprejudice, moral judgment development, moral identity, and authenticity.
To test participants on these various aspects, participants were divided into groups
according to their scores on an explicit and an implicit measure of attitudes regarding
African Americans. Participants who had scores indicating low prejudice on the explicit
measure were further divided according to their scores on the implicit measure into low,
medium, and high groups. Participants who were low in explicit prejudice and high in
implicit prejudice were categorized as aversive racists, while those low in explicit and
implicit prejudice were categorized as truly low prejudiced.
It was hypothesized that aversive racists would differ from truly low prejudiced
people on eight different constructs. The data presented here indicate that aversive racists
did not differ from low prejudice people on any of the examined constructs. The only
significant differences found were between the low prejudice group and the medium
implicit prejudice group. The low prejudice group operated from the personal interest
schema to a greater extent than the medium implicit prejudice group. Also, the medium
implicit prejudice group operated from the postconventional schema to a greater extent
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than the low prejudice group.
Unlike Van Heil and Mervielde (2005), aversive racists were not found to differ
from low prejudice people on social dominance orientation or authoritarianism. This may
be due to the differences in how aversive racism was defined in the two studies. In the
Van Heil and Mervielde study, aversive racism was defined as a reluctance to interact
with a member of an out-group. In addition, the samples used in the two studies varied
from each other, the Van Heil and Mervielde sample consisted of Europeans, while this
study’s sample consisted of U.S. citizens. It may be possible that aversive racists are
more pronounced in the European culture, which may explain the differences found
between the current study and the Van Heil and Mervielde study.
Further analyses comparing participants who were high in explicit prejudice to
participants low in explicit prejudice (i.e., the three aforementioned groups) were
performed. The low explicit and high explicit groups were compared on the same eight
constructs: authenticity, moral judgment development, moral identity, nonprejudice,
social dominance, authoritarianism, empathy, and social desirability. These analyses
found that participants high in explicit prejudice scored lower on moral identity
internalization, authenticity, nonprejudice, and postconventional moral reasoning
compared to participants low in explicit prejudice. Those participants high in explicit
prejudice also displayed greater amounts of social dominance orientation,
authoritarianism, and personal interest moral reasoning compared to participants low in
explicit prejudice.
The differences found between people high in explicit prejudice and people low in
explicit prejudice are not revolutionary and agree with past findings. In agreement with
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the McFarland (in press) study, postconventional reasoning was found to differentiate
people who differed in explicit prejudice. In keeping with the trend (i.e., Phillips & Ziller,
1997), people low in explicit prejudice were found to have greater amounts of
nonprejudice compared to people high in explicit prejudice. People high in explicit
prejudice displayed greater amounts of social dominance orientation compared to those
low in explicit prejudice, which replicates Pratto et al. (1994). People high in explicit
prejudice displayed greater amounts of authoritarianism compared to those low in explicit
prejudice, which supports Altemeyer (1988).
People high in explicit prejudice were also found to differ on levels of
authenticity and moral identity, which has not been documented before. People high in
explicit prejudice were found to have lower authenticity scores compared to people low
in explicit prejudice. This suggests that explicitly prejudice people do not understand
themselves as well as people with less explicit prejudice do. People high in explicit
prejudice were also found to have lower moral identity internalization scores compared to
people low in explicit prejudice. This suggests that moral traits are not as large a portion
of the explicitly prejudiced person’s life in comparison to the non-explicitly prejudiced
person. This finding also supports the validity of the Moral Identity Scale because a
person high in explicit prejudice would not be expected to have a high moral identity.
Overall, the data suggest that being an aversive racist may not have a truly
significant effect on a person’s life – at least as far as the constructs considered in this
study are concerned. While people who explicitly express a lack of prejudice may have
implicit prejudices, it appears that these biases are not transferred to other relevant areas.
The findings from this study suggest that the more important factor appears to be what a
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person explicitly reports. People that are explicitly prejudiced differ from people who are
not explicitly prejudiced on many different aspects. Even though a person’s implicit
attitude may differ from his or her explicit attitude, the current study supports that it is the
person’s explicit attitude that truly matters where the measured areas are concerned.
Another point arises from the data. The mild implicit prejudice group and the
aversive racists both had fairly high postconventional scores compared to the low
prejudice group (The mild implicit prejudiced group differed significantly from the low
prejudice group, and the mild implicit prejudiced group and the aversive racists did not
significantly differ from each other). Having a high postconventional score could be the
factor that allows these people to keep from either acting on or transferring their implicit
biases to other areas. This finding may therefore support Rest’s four component model of
moral functioning (Narvaez & Rest, 1995). This model suggests that moral behavior is a
factor of four components: Moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral motivation, and
implementation. In regards to the moral functioning of the mild implicit prejudice and
aversive racist groups, having a high postconventional score could be what prevents their
implicit prejudice from bypassing their moral motivation. Because this study did not
obtain any behavioral data from the participants, there is another possibility that Rest’s
four component model (Narvaez & Rest) would support. It might be that implicit biases
exist among the mild prejudice and aversive racist groups exist due to deficiencies in
components like moral sensitivity and/or moral motivation.
An additional aspect needs to be considered in explaining the findings of this
study. The lack of differentiation between aversive racists and low prejudice people may
be an artifact of the IAT. When assessing bias against African-Americans, the IAT
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presents pictures of African-Americans and European-Americans along with negative
and positive words (Greenwald et al., 1998). Because of this, scores can be interpreted in
three ways: biased against African-Americans, biased against European-Americans, or
unbiased. The presence of a negative bias against African-Americans was the concern in
this study. Participants that displayed negative bias against European-Americans were
still included in the analysis and because of the manner in which the participants were
categorized, they were further included into the low prejudice group (because they
showed no bias against African-Americans). The similarity of scores between aversive
racists (implicit bias against African-Americans) and truly low prejudiced people (some
of which display bias against European-Americans) may be due to the presence of some
sort of bias against a racial or ethnic group existing in both groups.
Strengths and Limitations
Before discussing strengths, the limitations of the study will be addressed. In
labeling participants as aversive racists, the IAT was used to distinguish participants in
regards to their implicit biases (or lack thereof). Since the inception of the IAT, the
method has been criticized. Arkes and Tetlock (2004) suggest different interpretations of
IAT scores. The effects seen in the IAT may be due to cultural stereotypes rather than
personal beliefs or due to cognitive processes that are not necessarily prejudiced (Arkes
& Tetlock). Kinoshita and Peek-O’Leary (2005) suggest that the negative bias seen
against a certain ethnic or racial group can be due to familiarity rather than actual
negative affect toward that group. Because these interpretations are plausible, it is
possible that the scores from the IAT in the current study may be due to these other
interpretations. If this is the case, then the lack of differentiation between aversive racists
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and truly low prejudiced people, as defined in this study, is understandable.
A further limitation concerning the IAT is its duel nature. The IAT can assess bias
against African-Americans and European-Americans. If a person shows bias against
African-Americans, then he or she will not show bias against European-Americans, when
in actuality they may hold a negative affect against both sets of people. The lack of a
score suggesting bias against a certain group may not necessarily mean that negative
associations do not exist for that group. It may instead mean that a certain person has
equally negative associations against more than one group of people, or perhaps the
person has a more negative association with another group. The point remains, however,
that a person may have a negative association even if the IAT does not suggest the person
does.
Another limitation associated with this study is generalizability of the results.
Because of the original definition of an aversive racist (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), only
European-Americans were examined. This greatly limits the generalizability of the
results to only one race in a nation where multiple races and ethnic groups coexist. The
sample was also young adult college students and did not represent all ages during
adulthood.
Finally, participants were categorized into groups according to continuous
variables. Normative data were not available to ensure the way the groups were
categorized was the most accurate division of the participants. The groups were
determined by cut off points that theoretically seemed to distinguish high and low
prejudice. Without normative data to support these cut off points, the accuracy of these
designations is uncertain.
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A strength associated with this study is the wide variety of constructs considered
in the examination of aversive racism. This study incorporated many different constructs
in order to achieve a more detailed picture of the topic of interest. Another strength of
this study was the manner in which the data was collected in two sessions. This allowed
participants to keep from becoming fatigued and becoming apathetic in their responses.
Further, this study helps bring more understanding to the concept of prejudice and
behavior related to prejudice. Crimes committed against a person that are motivated by
the offenders’ bias against race, religion, disability, sexual orientation, or
ethnicity/nationality (i.e., hate crimes) total to 9,035 in 2004 (Department of Justice,
2004). Of those 9,035 crimes, 6,064 were committed because of race and or ethnicity
(Department of Justice). Given these high rates of crime, which are motivated by
prejudices, understanding prejudice – whether implicit or explicit – is imperative. This
study assists in understanding the phenomenon of prejudice.
Future Directions
In the future, the inclusion of more racial and ethnic groups into the sample would
be a great improvement. This would allow the data to be generalized to a greater
proportion of the population. Also, other biases against more racial and ethnic groups
should be examined. While certain things may be true for explicit and implicit biases
against African-Americans, it would be interesting to see if these same sorts of trends
hold for biases against other ethnic groups.
Other methods for categorizing people as aversive racists should also be used to
determine if the results from this current study hold up, or if they had been distorted
because of the concerns associated with the IAT. In some aversive racism literature,
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people are categorized as aversive racists according to a behavioral task. Generally,
participants are given a task where they select people for admittance to a college,
employment, or pay raises (e.g., Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000; Hodson, Dovidio, &
Gaertner, 2002). Using a task in which participants make a selection decision based on
ambiguous information has demonstrated that some people tend to make decisions
favoring their own racial group. Using the selection decision task may be a better method
for categorizing aversive racists than the IAT. Further, using behavioral data could
further confirm the groupings used for this study and help draw more precise conclusions
about aversive racism. For instance, it may confirm that it translates to behavior but not
to other related areas (such as those addressed in this study).
The finding that participants high and mild in implicit prejudice have elevated
postconventional scores compared to low prejudice participants suggests more
examination in this area are warranted. As noted earlier, Rest’s four component model
makes the findings of this study interpretable in two different ways. Hence, a future study
should examine other components of Rest’s four component model of moral functioning
(i.e., moral sensitivity, moral judgment, moral motivation, and implementation) to
determine how aversive racism best fits into this model.
Conclusion
In conclusion, no significant differences were found between aversive racists and
low prejudice people. Further evidence was found distinguishing people high in explicit
prejudice from people low in explicit prejudice. The results suggest three implications.
First, while a person may have implicit biases, what appears to matter more is what that
person’s explicit attitude is. Second, the implicitly biased groups had high
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postconventional scores, which could be the factor that is keeping these people from
transferring their implicit prejudices to other aspects of their lives. Third, the lack of
distinction between aversive racists and low prejudice people may be due to an artifact of
the IAT. While no constructs were found to differ between aversive racists and low
prejudice people, further exploration with a different method of labeling participants as
aversive racists is needed.
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Demographics
1. Age:_____ years.
2. Gender (circle one): Male

Female

3. Education level: ______ Freshman
______ Sophomore
______ Junior
______ Senior
______ Other: _______________
4. Ethnicity (optional):
_______ African American
________ American Indian of Alaska Native
________ Asian
________ European American
________ Hispanic/Latino
________ Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
________ Other: _____________________
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Appendix B
Authenticity Inventory 3
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AI3
The following measure has a variety of statements that involves peoples’ perceptions about their
self. There are no right or wrong responses so please answer honestly. Use the following scale
when responding to each statement by writing the number from the scale below which you feel
most accurately characterizes your response to the statement.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither Agree
Nor Disagree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

_____1. I am often confused about my feelings.
_____2. I frequently pretend to enjoy something when in actuality I really don't.
_____3. For better or for worse I am aware of who I truly am.
_____4. I understand why I believe the things I do about myself.
_____5. I want people with whom I am close to understand my strengths.
_____6. I actively try to understand which of my self-aspects fit together to form my
core or true self.
_____7. I am very uncomfortable objectively considering my limitations and shortcomings.
_____8. I’ve often used my silence or head-nodding to convey agreement with someone
else’s statement or position even though I really disagree.
_____9. I have a very good understanding of why I do the things I do.
_____10. I am willing to change myself for others if the reward is desirable enough.
_____11. I find it easy to pretend to be something other than my true self.
_____12. I want people with whom I am close to understand my weaknesses.
_____13. I find it very difficult to critically assess myself.
_____14. I am not in touch with my deepest thoughts and feelings.
_____15. I make it a point to express to close others how much I truly care for them.
_____16. I tend to have difficulty accepting my personal faults, so I try to cast them in a
more positive way.
_____17. I tend to idealize close others rather than objectively see them as they truly are.
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_____18. If asked, people I am close to can accurately describe what kind of person I am.
_____19. I prefer to ignore my darkest thoughts and feelings.
_____20. I am aware of when I am not being my true self.
_____21. I am able to distinguish those self-aspects that are important to my core or true
self from those that are unimportant.
_____22. People close to me would be shocked or surprised if they discovered what I
keep inside me.
_____23. It is important for me to understand my close others' needs and desires.
_____24. I want close others to understand the real me rather than just my public persona
or "image"
_____25. I try to act in a manner that is consistent with my personally held values, even
if others criticize or reject me for doing so.
_____26. If a close other and I are in disagreement I would rather ignore the issue than
constructively work it out.
_____27. I’ve often done things that I don’t want to do merely not to disappoint people.
_____28. I find that my behavior typically expresses my values.
_____29. I actively attempt to understand myself as best as possible.
_____30. I’d rather feel good about myself than objectively assess my personal
limitations and shortcomings.
_____31. I find that my behavior typically expresses my personal needs and desires.
_____32. I rarely if ever, put on a “false face” for others to see
_____33. I spend a lot of energy pursuing goals that are very important to other people
even though they are unimportant to me.
_____34. I frequently am not in touch with what’s important to me.
_____35. I try to block out any unpleasant feelings I might have about myself.
_____36. I often question whether I really know what I want to accomplish in my
lifetime.
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_____37. I often find that I am overly critical about myself.
_____38. I am in touch with my motives and desires.
_____39. I often deny the validity of any compliments that I receive.
_____40. In general, I place a good deal of importance on people I am close to
understanding who I truly am.
_____41. I find it difficult to embrace and feel good about the things I have accomplished.
_____42. If someone points out or focuses on one of my shortcomings I quickly try to
block it out of my mind and forget it.
_____43. The people I am close to can count on me being who I am regardless of what
setting we are in.
_____44. My openness and honesty in close relationships are extremely important to me.
_____45. I am willing to endure negative consequences by expressing my true beliefs
about things.
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Defining Issues Test 2
FAMINE
The small village in northern India has experienced shortages of food before, but
this year's famine is worse than ever. Some families are even trying to sustain themselves
by making soup from tree bark. Mustaq Singh's family is near starvation. He had heard
that a rich man in his village has supplies of food stored away and is hoarding food while
its price goes higher so that he can sell the food later at a huge profit. Mustaq was
desperate and thinks about stealing some food from the rich man's warehouse. The small
amount of food that he needs for his family probably wouldn't be missed.
What should Mustaq Singh do? Do you favor the action of taking the food? (Mark one)
___ Should take the food

____ Can’t Decide

____ Should not take the food

Please rate in the space beside each statement how important each particular
item/question is in making a decision about what you should do one way or another.
1=Great 2=Much 3=Some 4=Little 5=No
1. Is Mustaq Singh courageous enough to risk getting caught stealing? ___
2. Isn't it only natural for a loving father to care so much for his family that he would
steal? ___
3. Shouldn't the community's laws be upheld? ___
4. Does Mustaq Singh know a good recipe for preparing soup from tree bark? ___
5. Does the rich man have any legal right to store food when other people are
starving? ___
6. Is the motive of Mustaq Singh to steal for himself or to steal for his family? ___
7. What values are going to be the basis for social cooperation? ___
8. Is the epitome of eating reconcilable with the culpability of stealing?___
9. Does the rich man deserve to be robbed for being so greedy? ___
10. Isn't private property an institution to enable the rich to exploit the poor? ___
11. Would stealing bring about more total good for everybody concerned or not? ___
12. Are laws getting in the way of the most basic claim of any member of society? ___
Now that you have rated these items, please rank them below from most important to
fourth most important in making a decision about what Mustaq Singh should do.
_____ # of Most important item

_____ # of Third most important item

_____ # of Second most important

_____ # of Fourth most important item

REPORTER
Molly Dayton has been a news reporter for the Gazette newspaper for over a
decade. Almost by accident, she learned that one of the candidates for Lieutenant
Governor for her state, Grover Thompson, had been arrested for shop-lifting, 20 years
earlier. Reporter Dayton found out that early in his life, Candidate Thompson had
undergone a confused period and done things he later regretted which were very out-of-
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character now. His shop-lifting had been a minor offense and charges had been dropped
by the department store. Thompson has not only straightened himself out since then, but
in addition built a distinguished record in helping many people and in leading community
projects. Now, Reporter Dayton regards Thompson as the best candidate in the field and
likely to go on to important leadership positions in the state. Reporter Dayton wonders
whether or not she should write the story about Thompson's earlier troubles because in
the upcoming close and heated election, she fears that such a news story would wreck
Thompson's chance to win.
Do you favor the action of reporting the story? (Mark one)
___ Should report the story

____ Can’t Decide

____ Should not report the story

Please rate in the space beside each statement how important each particular
item/question is in making a decision about what you should do one way or another.
1=Great 2=Much 3=Some 4=Little 5=No
1. Doesn't the public have a right to know all the facts about all the candidates for
office? ___
2. Would publishing the story help Reporter Dayton's reputation for investigative
reporting? ___
3. If Dayton doesn't publish the story wouldn't another reporter get the story anyway and
get the credit for investigative reporting? ___
4. Since voting is such a joke anyway, does it make any difference what reporter Dayton
does? ___
5. Hasn't Thompson shown in the past 20 years that he is a better person than his earlier
days as a shop-lifter? ___
6. What would best serve society? ___
7. If the story is true, how can it be wrong to report it? ___
8. How could reporter Dayton be so cruel and heartless as to report the damaging story
about candidate Thompson? ___
9. Does the right of 'habeas corpus' apply in this case? ___
10. Would the election process be more fair with or without reporting the story? ___
11. Should reporter Dayton treat all candidates for office in the same way by reporting
everything she learns about them, good and bad? ___
12. Isn't it a reporter's duty to report all the news regardless of the circumstances? ___
Now that you have rated these items, please rank them below from most important to
fourth most important in making a decision about what Reporter Dayton should do.
_____ # of Most important item

_____ # of Third most important item

_____ # of Second most important

_____ # of Fourth most important item
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SCHOOL BOARD
Mr. Grant was elected to the School Board District 190 and was chosen to be
Chairman. The district was bitterly divided over the closing of one of the high schools.
One of the high schools had to be closed for financial reasons, but there was no
agreement over which school to close. During his election to the School Board, Mr. Grant
had proposed a series of "Open Meetings" in which members of the community could
voice their opinions. He hoped that dialogue would make the community realize the
necessity of closing one high school. Also he hoped that through open discussion, the
difficulty of the decision would be appreciated, and the community would ultimately
support the school board decision. The first Open Meeting was a disaster. Passionate
speeches dominated the microphones and threatened violence. The meeting barely closed
without fist-fights. Later in the week, school board members received threatening phone
calls. Mr. Grant wonders if he ought to call off the next Open Meeting.
Do you favor calling off the next Open Meeting? (Mark one)
___ Should call off the next open meeting ____ Can’t Decide ____ Should have the next
open meeting
Please rate in the space beside each statement how important each particular
item/question is in making a decision about what you should do one way or another.
1=Great 2=Much 3=Some 4=Little 5=No
1. Is Mr. Grant required by law to have Open Meetings on major school board
decisions? ___
2. Would Mr. Grant be breaking his election campaign promises to the community by
discontinuing the Open Meetings? ___
3. Would the community be even angrier with Mr. Grant if he stopped the Open
Meetings? ___
4. Would the change in plans prevent scientific assessment? ___
5. If the school board is threatened, does the chairman have the legal authority to protect
the Board by making decisions in closed meetings? ___
6. Would the community regard Mr. Grant as a coward if he stopped the Open
Meetings? ___
7. Does Mr. Grant have another procedure in mind for ensuring that divergent views are
heard? ___
8. Does Mr. Grant have the authority to expel troublemakers from the meetings or
prevent them from making long speeches? ___
9. Are some people deliberately undermining the school board process by playing some
sort of power game? ___
10. What effect would stopping the discussion have on the community's ability to handle
controversial issues in the future? ___
11. Is the trouble coming from only a few hotheads, and is the community in general
really fair-minded and democratic? ___
12. What is the likelihood that a good decision could be made without open discussion
from the community? ___
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Now that you have rated these items, please rank them below from most important to
fourth most important in making a decision about what Mr. Grant should do.
_____ # of Most important item

_____ # of Third most important item

_____ # of Second most important

_____ # of Fourth most important item

CANCER
Mrs. Bennett is 62 years old, and in the last phases of colon cancer. She is in
terrible pain and asks the doctor to give her more pain-killer medicine. The doctor has
given her the maximum safe dose already and is reluctant to increase the dosage because
it would probably hasten her death. In a clear and rational mental state, Mrs. Bennett says
that she realizes this; but she wants to end her suffering even if it means ending her life.
Should the doctor giver her an increased dosage?
Do you favor the action of giving more medicine? (Mark one)
____ Should give Mrs. Bennett an increased dosage to make her die
____ Can’t Decide
____ Should not give her an increased dosage
Please rate in the space beside each statement how important each particular
item/question is in making a decision about what you should do one way or another.
1=Great 2=Much 3=Some 4=Little 5=No
1. Isn't the doctor obligated by the same laws as everybody else if giving an overdose
would be the same as killing her? ___
2. Wouldn't society be better off without so many laws about what doctors can and
cannot do? ___
3. If Mrs. Bennett dies, would the doctor be legally responsible for malpractice? ___
4. Does the family of Mrs. Bennett agree that she should get more painkiller
medicine? ___
5. Is the painkiller medicine an active heliotropic drug? ___
6. Does the state have the right to force continued existence on those who don't want to
live? ___
7. Is helping to end another's life ever a responsible act of cooperation? ___
8. Would the doctor show more sympathy for Mrs. Bennett by giving the medicine or
not? ___
9. Wouldn't the doctor feel guilty from giving Mrs. Bennett so much drug that she
died? ___
10. Should only God decide when a person's life should end? ___
11. Shouldn't society protect everyone against being killed? ___
12. Where should society draw the line between protecting life and allowing someone to
die if the person wants to? ___
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Now that you have rated these items, please rank them below from most important to
fourth most important in making a decision about what the doctor should do.
_____ # of Most important item

_____ # of Third most important item

_____ # of Second most important

_____ # of Fourth most important item

DEMONSTRATION
Political and economic instability in a South American country prompted the
President of the United States to send troops to "police" the area. Students at many
campuses in the U.S.A. have protested that the United States was using its military might
for economic advantage. There is widespread suspicion that big oil multinational
companies were pressuring the President to safeguard a cheap oil supply even if it means
loss of life. Students at one campus took to the streets in demonstration, tying up traffic
and stopping regular business in town. The president of the university demanded that the
students stop their illegal demonstrations. Students then took over the college's
administration building, completely paralyzing the college. Are the students right to
demonstrate in these ways?
Do you favor the action of demonstrating in these ways?
____ Should continue demonstrating in these ways
___ Can’t Decide
____ Should not continue demonstrating in these ways
Please rate in the space beside each statement how important each particular
item/question is in making a decision about what you should do one way or another.
1=Great 2=Much 3=Some 4=Little 5=No
1. Do the students have any right to take over property that doesn't belong to them? ___
2. Do the students realize that they might be arrested and fined, and even expelled from
school? ___
3. Are the students serious about their cause or are they doing it just for fun? ___
4. If the university president is soft on students this time, will it lead to more
disorder? ___
5. Will the public blame all students for the actions of a few demonstrators? ___
6. Are the authorities to blame by giving in to the greed of the multinational oil
companies? ___
7. Why should a few people like the Presidents and business leaders have more power
than ordinary people? ___
8. Does this student demonstration bring about more or less good in the long run to all
people? ___
9. Can the students justify their civil disobedience? ___
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10. Shouldn't the authorities be respected by students? ___
11. Is taking over a building consistent with principles of justice? ___
12. Isn't it everyone's duty to obey the law, whether one likes it or not? ___
Now that you have rated these items, please rank them below from most important to
fourth most important in making a decision about what the students should do.
_____ # of Most important item

_____ # of Third most important item

_____ # of Second most important

_____ # of Fourth most important item
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Appendix D
Moral Identity Scale
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Self Description Scale
(i.e., Moral Identity Scale)
Listed below are some characteristics that may describe a person:
Caring
Compassionate
Fair
Friendly
Generous
Hardworking
Helpful
Honest
Kind
The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else. For a
moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics.
Imagine how that person would think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of
what this person would be like answer the following questions using the scale below.
1
Strongly
Disagree

2
Disagree

3
Neither Agree
Nor Disagree

4
Agree

5
Strongly
Agree

_____ 1. It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics.
_____ 2. Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am.
_____ 3. I would be ashamed to be a person who has these characteristics.
_____ 4. Having these characteristics is not really important to me.
_____ 5. I strongly desire to have these characteristics.
_____ 6. I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics.
_____ 7. The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me as
having these characteristics.
_____ 8. The kinds of books and magazines that I read identify me as having these
characteristics.
_____ 9. The fact that I have these characteristics is communicated to others by my
membership in certain organizations.
_____ 10. I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I have
these characteristics.
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Universal Orientation Scale
Directions: Using the scale below, indicate to what extent each of the following
statements describes you or your opinion.
1
Does not
describe me
well

2

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1
1

2
2

3
3

4
4

5
5

1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4

5
5
5
5
5
5

1

2

3

4

5

1
1
1

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4

5
5
5

1
1
1

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4

5
5
5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

1

2

3

4

5

3
Not Sure

4

5
Describes me
very well

1. The similarities between males and females are greater than
the differences.
2. I tend to value similarities over differences when I meet
someone.
3. At one level of thinking we are all of a kind.
4. I can understand almost anyone because I’m a little like
everyone.
5. Little differences among people mean a lot.
6. I can see myself fitting into many groups.
7. There is potential for good and evil in all of us.
8. When I look into the eyes of others I see myself.
9. I could never get accustomed to living in another country.
10. When I first meet someone I tend to notice differences
between myself and the other person.
11. “Between” describes my position with regard to groups
better than does “in” and “out.”
12. The same spirit dwells in everyone.
13. Older persons are very different than I am.
14. I can tell a great deal about a person by knowing their
gender.
15. There is a certain beauty in everyone.
16. I can tell a great deal about a person by knowing their age.
17. Men and women will never totally understand each other
because of their inborn differences.
18. Everyone in the world is very much alike because in the end
we all die.
19. I have difficulty relating to persons who are much younger
than I.
20. When I meet someone I tend to notice similarities between
myself and the other person.
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Social Dominance Orientation Scale
Which of the following objects or statements do you have a positive or negative feeling
towards? Beside each object or statement place a number from ‘1’ to ‘7’ which represents
the degree of your positive or negative feeling.
1 (Very negative), 2 (Negative), 3 (Slightly negative), 4 (Neither positive or negative), 5
(Slightly positive), 6 (Positive), 7 (Very positive)
1. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups. ___
2. In getting what you want, it is sometimes necessary to use force against
other groups. ___
3. It’s OK if some groups have more of a chance in life than others. ___
4. To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on other groups. ___
5. If certain groups stayed in their place, we would have fewer problems. ___
6. It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the
bottom. ___
7. Inferior groups should stay in their place. ___
8. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place. ___
9. It would be good if groups could be equal. ___
10. Group equality should be our ideal. ___
11. All groups should be given an equal chance in life. ___
12. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. ___
13. Increased social equality. ___
14. We would have fewer problems if we treated people more equally. ___
15. We should strive to make incomes as equal as possible. ___
16. No one group should dominate in society. ___
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Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale
This survey is part of an investigation of general public opinion concerning a variety of
social issues. You will probably find that you agree with some of the statements, and
disagree with others, to varying extents. Please indicate your reaction to each of the
statements by recording a number beside each statement, according to the following
scale:
-4 if you very strongly disagree with the statement
-3 if you strongly disagree with the statement
-2 if you moderately disagree with the statement
-1 if you slightly disagree with the statement
0 if you feel neutral about the statement
+1 if you slightly agree with the statement
+2 if you moderately agree with the statement
+3 if you strongly agree with the statement
+4 if you very strongly agree with the statement
You may find that you sometimes have different reactions to different parts of the
statement. For example, you might very strongly disagree (“-4”) with one idea in a
statement, but slightly agree (“+1”) with another idea in the same item. When this
happens, please combine your reactions, and write down how you feel “on balance” (that
is, a “-3” in this example).
___ 1. The established authorities generally turn out to be right about things, while the
radicals
and protestors are usually just “loud mouths” showing off their ignorance.
___ 2. Women should have to promise to obey their husbands when they get married.
___ 3. Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to
destroy
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the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us.
___ 4. Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else.
___ 5. It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government
and
religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to create
doubt in people’s minds
___ 6. Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no
doubt every
bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly.
___ 7. The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our
traditional
values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers spreading bad
ideas.
___ 8. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps.
___ 9. Our country needs free thinkers who have the courage to defy traditional ways,
even if this
upsets many people.
___ 10. Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating
away at
our moral fiber and traditional beliefs.
___ 11. Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual
preferences, even if
it makes them different from everyone else.
___ 12. The “old-fashioned ways” and the “old-fashioned values” still show the best way
to live.
___ 13. You have to admire those who challenged the law and the majority’s view by
protesting
for women’s abortion rights, for animal rights, or to abolish school prayer.
___ 14. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil,
and take
us back to our true path.
___ 15. Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our
government,
criticizing religion, and ignoring the “normal way things are supposed to be done.”
___ 16. God’s laws about abortion, pornography and marriage must be strictly followed
before it is
too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished.
___ 17. There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to
ruin it for
their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action.
___ 18. A “woman’s place” should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women
are
submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past.
___ 19. Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the
authorities
tell us to do, and get rid of the “rotten apples” who are ruining everything.
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___ 20. There is no “ONE right way” to live life; everybody has to create their own way.
___ 21. Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy
“traditional
family values.
___ 22. This country would work a lot better if certain groups of troublemakers would
just shut up
and accept their group’s traditional place in society.
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Interpersonal Reactivity Index
Mark the following items from 0 (Does not describe me very well) to 4 (Describes me
very well).
1. I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might
happen to me. ___
2. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. ___
3. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the "other guy's" point of view. ___
4. Sometimes I don't feel sorry for other people when they are having problems. ___
5. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel. ___
6. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease. ___
7. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don't often get completely
caught up in it. ___
8. I try to look at everybody's side of a disagreement before I make a decision. ___
9. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective
toward them. ___
10. I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation. ___
11. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from
their perspective. ___
12. Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for me. ___
13. When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm. ___
14. Other people's misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. ___
15. If I'm sure I'm right about something, I don't waste much time listening to other
people's arguments. ___
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16. After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters. ___
17. Being in a tense emotional situation scares me. ___
18. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don't feel very much pity for
them. ___
19. I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies. ___
20. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. ___
21. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both. ___
22. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. ___
23. When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a leading
character. ___
24. I tend to lose control during emergencies. ___
25. When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to "put myself in his shoes" for a while. ___
26. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the
events in the story were happening to me. ___
27. When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces. ___
28. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in
their place. ___
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Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding version 6
Using the scale below as a guide, write a number beside each statement to indicate how
much you agree with it.
1-----------2----------3-----------4----------5----------6----------7
NOT TRUE SOMEWHAT TRUE VERY TRUE
_____ 1. My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right.
_____ 2. It would be hard for me to break any of my bad habits.
_____ 3. I don’t care to know what other people really think of me.
_____ 4. I have not always been honest with myself.
_____ 5. I always know why I like things.
_____ 6. When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking.
_____ 7. Once I’ve made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion.
_____ 8. I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit.
_____ 9. I am fully in control of my own fate.
_____ 10. It’s hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought.
_____ 11. I never regret my decisions.
_____ 12. I sometimes lose out on things because I can’t make up my mind soon enough.
_____ 13. The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference.
_____ 14. My parents were not always fair when they punished me.
_____ 15. I am a completely rational person.
_____ 16. I rarely appreciate criticism.
_____ 17. I am very confident of my judgments.
_____ 18. I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover.
_____ 19. It’s all right with me if some people happen to dislike me.
_____ 20. I don’t always know the reasons why I do the things I do.
_____ 21. I sometimes tell lies if I have to.
_____ 22. I never cover up my mistakes.
_____ 23. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.
_____ 24. I never swear.
_____ 25. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.
_____ 26. I always obey laws, even if I’m unlikely to get caught.
_____ 27. I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back.
_____ 28. When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening.
_____ 29. I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her.
_____ 30. I always declare everything at customs.
_____ 31. When I was young I sometimes stole things.
_____ 32. I have never dropped litter on the street.
_____ 33. I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit.
_____ 34. I never read sexy books or magazines.
_____ 35. I have done things that I don’t tell other people about.
_____ 36. I never take things that don’t belong to me.
_____ 37. I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn’t really sick.
_____ 38. I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it.
_____ 39. I have some pretty awful habits.
_____ 40. I don’t gossip about other people’s business.
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Attitude Toward Blacks Scale
Using the scale below, indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following
statements. Place the corresponding number beside the statement.
1 Strongly disagree
2 Disagree
3 Slightly disagree
4 Undecided
5 Slightly agree
6 Agree
7 Strongly agree
1. If a black were put in charge of me, I would not mind taking advice and direction from
him or her. ___
2. If I had a chance to introduce black visitors to my friends and neighbors, I would be
pleased to do so. ___
3. I would rather not have blacks live in the same apartment building I live in. ___
4. I would probably feel somewhat self-conscious dancing with a black in a public
place. ___
5. I would not mind it at all if a black family with about the same income and education
as me moved in next door. ___
6. I think that black people look more similar to each other than white people do. ___
7. Interracial marriage should be discouraged to avoid the “who-am-I?” confusion which
the children feel. ___
8. I get very upset when I hear a white make a prejudicial remark about blacks. ___
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9. I favor open housing laws that allow more racial integration of neighborhoods. ___
10. I would not bother me if my new roommate was black. ___
11. It is likely that blacks will bring violence to neighborhoods when they move in. ___
12. I enjoy a funny racial joke, even if some people might find it offensive. ___
13. The federal government should take decisive steps to override the injustices blacks
suffer at the hands of local authorities. ___
14. Black and white people are inherently equal. ___
15. Black people are demanding too much too fast in their push for equal rights. ___
16. Whites should support blacks in their struggle against discrimination and
segregation. ___
17. Generally, blacks are not as smart as whites. ___
18. I worry that in the next few years I may be denied my application for a job or a
promotion because of preferential treatment given to minority group members. ___
19. Racial integration (of schools, businesses, residences, etc.) has benefitted both whites
and blacks. ___
20. Some blacks are so touchy about race that it is difficult to get along with them. ___

82

Appendix K
Informed Consent Document and Human Subjects Review Board Approval

83
INFORMED CONSENT DOCUMENT
Project Title: Addressing the Relationships Among Aspects of Self and Social Attitudes
Investigator: Bryan Hall
Psychology Department 502-460-0595
W. Pitt Derryberry, Ph.D.
Psychology Department 270-745-5250

bryan.hall@wku.edu
pitt.derryberry@wku.edu

You are being asked to participate in a project conducted through Western Kentucky
University. The University requires that you give your signed agreement to participate in
this project.
The investigator will explain to you in detail the purpose of the project, the procedures to
be used, and the potential benefits and possible risks of participation. You may ask
him/her any questions you have to help you understand the project. A basic explanation
of the project is written below. Please read this explanation and discuss with the
researcher any questions you may have. If you then decide to participate in the project,
please sign on the last page of this form in the presence of the person who explained the
project to you. You should be given a copy of this form to keep.
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

Nature and Purpose of the Project: The purpose of this research project is to
address the relationships among various constructs of self and social attitudes.
Explanation of Procedures: Participation in this study involves completing 12
questionnaires. If you decide to participate in this study, you will complete the 10
questionnaires on-line after submitting this document. After you complete the first
10 questionnaires you will schedule a session to complete the remaining two
questionnaires questionnaires. The questionnaires to be completed ask
participants to report demographic information, information about their thoughts
about various social dilemmas and situations, attitudes, and aspects of self. In the
laboratory participants will complete a categorization task on a computer in which
you will categorize pictures and adjectives according to a set of rules. Your
participation in this study will take around 90 to 120 minutes.
Discomfort and Risks: There is minimal or no risk to you in participating in this
study. This study involves some self disclosure, and a commitment of your time is
also involved.
Benefits: Your participation in this research will contribute to psychological
research by helping to better understand how individuals differ on self-constructs
and attitudes.
Confidentiality: Answers and information obtained in this study will remain
anonymous and confidential and will be used solely for the purposes of this study.
Additionally, answers and information obtained will not be identifiable as your
specific answers. If you should become uncomfortable at any time, you have the
right to discontinue your participation, and your answers will be removed from
the study. You have the option to refuse to answer any question and remain in the
study. Only group data will appear in any reports of this study.
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6.

Refusal/Withdrawal: Refusal to participate in this study will have no effect on
any future services you may be entitled to from the University. Anyone who
agrees to participate in this study is free to withdraw from the study at any time
with no penalty.

If you have read and understand the parameters of this study and wish to participate,
please read the statement that follows and then click the submit button below:
I understand that it is not possible to identify all potential risks in an experimental
procedure, and I believe that reasonable safeguards have been taken to minimize both the
known and potential but unknown risks.

-BY SUBMITTING THIS DOCUMENT, YOU ARE PROVIDING YOUR
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS RESEARCH PROJECT –
SUBMIT (wish to participate)

DON’T SUBMIT (do not wish to participate)

THE DATED APPROVAL ON THIS CONSENT FORM INDICATES THAT
THIS PROJECT HAS BEEN REVIEWED AND APPROVED BY
THE WESTERN KENTUCKY UNIVERSITY HUMAN SUBJECTS REVIEW BOARD
Sean Rubino, Compliance Manger
TELEPHONE: (270) 745-4652

HSRB APPLICATION # HS08-157
APPROVED 04/02/2008
EXEMPT

EXPEDITED

EXPIRES 04/02/2009
FULL BOARD

